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Since financial institutions are subjected to increasingly tighter requirements regarding the way they 
conduct their loan business, we could assume that built-in regulatory pressures induce them to adopt col-
lective business strategies, with the unintended consequence of persistently weakening the banking sys-
tem ability to cope with external shocks. Surprisingly, we find rather the opposite. This paper documents 
how banks, as a group, react to macroeconomic risk and uncertainty, and more specifically the way 
banks systemic behaviour evolves over the business cycle. Adopting the methodology of Beaudry et al. 
(2001), our results clearly indicate that the dispersion across banks traditional portfolios has actually in-
creased through time. We introduce an estimation procedure based on EGARCH and refine Baum et al. 
(2002, 2004, 2009) and Quagliariello (2007, 2009) framework to analyze the question in the new indus-
try context, i.e. shadow banking. Consistent with finance theory, we first confirm that banks tend to be-
have homogeneously vis-à-vis macroeconomic uncertainty. Additionally, we find that the cross-
sectional dispersions of loans to assets and non-traditional activities shrink essentially during downturns, 
when the resilience of the banking system is at its lowest. Our results also indicate that banks herd-like 
behaviour remains predominantly a cyclical phenomenon, almost unaffected by the new banking envi-
ronment. Most importantly however, the cross-sectional dispersion of market-oriented activities appears 
to be both more volatile and sensitive to the business cycle than the dispersion of the traditional banking 
business lines. 
JEL classification: C32; G20; G21. 
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Risque systémique bancaire et cycle économique : un exercice empiri-
que sur données canadiennes 
 
Résumé 
Puisque les institutions financières sont sujettes à des règles de plus en plus strictes à concernant la fa-
çon dont elles gèrent leurs prêts, nous pourrions faire l’hypothèse que les pressions émanant de la ré-
glementation financière les induisent à adopter des stratégies collectives, avec pour conséquence indési-
rable d’affaiblir de manière persistante la capacité du système financier à gérer les chocs externes. De 
façon surprenante, nous trouvons plutôt l’opposé. Ce papier documente comment les banques, comme 
groupe, réagissent au risque et à l’incertitude macroéconomique, et plus spécifiquement comment le ris-
que systémique évolue au cours du cycle économique. En adoptant la méthodologie de Beaudry et al. 
(2001), nous trouvons que la dispersion en coupe transversale des prêts bancaires a augmenté dans le 
temps. Nous faisons appel à une méthode d’estimation basée sur le EGARCH et nous élaborons le cadre 
analytique proposé par Baum et al. (2002, 2004, 2009) et Quagliariello (2007, 2009) pour analyser la 
question dans le contexte du « shadow banking », la nouvelle structure des banques canadiennes. En 
conformité avec la théorie financière, nous trouvons d’abord que les banques ont tendance à se compor-
ter de façon homogène vis-à-vis de l’incertitude macroéconomique. Nous trouvons également que la 
dispersion en coupe transversale des prêts et des activités bancaires non-traditionnelles a tendance à sur-
tout diminuer en récession, alors que la résilience du système bancaire est à son plus bas. Nos résultats 
montrent que le comportement mimétique des banques demeure principalement un phénomène cyclique, 
pratiquement indépendant du nouvel environnement bancaire. De façon plus importante, la dispersion en 
coupe transversale des activités bancaires non-traditionnelles semble plus volatile et plus sensible au cy-
cle économique que celle des activités de prêts.  
 
Classification JEL: C32; G20; G21. 
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The 1982 international sovereign debt crisis, the late 1980s Japanese crisis, the Fin-
land and Scandinavian banking crisis of 1987-1997, the 1997-1998 Asian crisis, and 
actually most financial crises are partly attributable to bank herding (Jain and Gupta 
1987, Hutchinson 2000, Hyytilen et al. 2003). Whether rational or behavioural, banks 
individual optimal response to external shocks can lead to aggregate patterns (Pecchino 
1990), which, in some cases, increase both systemic risk and failure rates – especially 
when disaster myopia is at work (Borio et al. 2001). For example, it is now widely 
admitted that the 2007 credit crisis has been severely accentuated by banking strategic 
complementarities, in the face of regulatory constraints (Wagner 2007, Adrian and 
Brunnermeier 2008, Farhi and Tirole 2009, Gauthier et al. 2010, Wagner 2010). In-
deed, there is often a trade-off between regulation benefits and the costs it entails, and 
legal limitations can put extra pressure on banks decision space (Vives 1996, Llwellyn 
2002, Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003). In this respect, within the current, market-oriented 
banking environment, the new restrictions on capital and liquidity introduced in Basle 
III might induce banks to get further involved in regulatory capital arbitrage (Jones 
2000, Calomiris and Mason 2004, Ambrose et al. 2005, Kling 2009, Brunnermeier 
2009, Cardone et al. 2010, Martin and Parigi, 2011). As they repeatedly did in the past, 
in this kind of situations banks engage in similar products innovation, financial engi-
neering and organizational restructuring to dodge regulatory requirements (Kane 1981, 
Barth et al. 1999, Vives 2010, Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson 2010). This regulatee 
avoidance generally translates into excessive risk-taking through product substitution 
and portfolios risk repackaging (e.g. Calmès and Théoret 2010, Wagner 2010). One 
particularly dramatic example of this kind of feedback effect is the growth in securiti-©   C CH HR RI IS ST TI IA AN N   C CA AL LM MÈ ÈS S   A AN ND D   R RA AY YM MO ON ND D   T TH HÉ ÉO OR RE ET T, ,   M MA AR RK KE ET T- -O OR RI IE EN NT TE ED D   B BA AN NK KI IN NG G   A AN ND D   B BA AN NK K   S SY YS ST TE EM MI IC C   R RI IS SK K, ,   
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zation of the largest US banks holdings preceding the 2007 credit crisis (Loutskina 
2011
1), with trading and cross-selling feeding a systemic risk bubble, up to its breaking 
point. 
Whilst regulators tend to focus on the tightening of capital standards and liquidity 
requirements, financial institutions are shifting their business model towards market-
oriented activities – i.e. shadow banking (Shin 2009). However, most authors seem 
now to agree that the business homogenization entailed by the diversification in non-
traditional operations might, in fact, reduce banking stability (e.g. Wagner 2007, 
Calmès and Théoret 2010, De Jonghe 2010)
2. Whether true or not, the new business 
environment the financial industry is facing motivates the analysis of the kind of im-
pact market-oriented banking can have on bank risk (Haiss 2005
3, Loutskina 2011). 
Indeed, given the “procyclicality”
4 of shadow banking, this question is particularly 
crucial for the monitoring of systemic risk buildups and for the conduct of macropru-
dential policy. In line with this problematic, the motivation of our research is to inves-
tigate whether the changes in the banking business have persistently affected the way 
in which financial institutions collectively respond to macroeconomic shocks.  
To support the “herding” theoretical concept introduced by Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983), many empirical studies try to identify leader banks. However, in practice, this 
approach suffers from several limitations. In particular, in most cases the leader banks 
actually differ depending on the type of diversification strategy examined (Jain and 
Gupta 1987). Besides, this methodology might be appropriate to depict cascade-
                                                      
1 According to Loutskina (2011), 40% of total loans outstanding were securitized at the end of 2007 in the United-States (versus 2.2% in 
1976). 
2 For example, the probability of bank failure seems to be positively correlated to the ratio of non-traditional to traditional activities (Barrell 
et al. 2010). 
3 Haiss (2005) provides an extensive literature review on the subject.  
4 In the literature banks are generally considered as “special” vis-à-vis the real economy. Authors usually refer to procyclicality as the phe-
nomenon by which banking shocks are propagated to the economy, or as banks feedback effect to macroeconomic shocks, i.e. shocks ampli-
fiers. Note that in this study we sometimes simply refer to the macroeconomic concept of procyclicality, i.e. the way a banking variable 
comoves with output.  
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herding, i.e. herding stricto sensus, but not necessarily herd-like, clustering behaviour, 
for which all banks react almost simultaneously to a common regime change. The fo-
cus of this paper concerns the latter situation, a case where the banking industry sys-
tematically allocates assets in the same way. Ceteris paribus, the more it is the case, 
the more likely the banking system lacks resilience, and, consequently, the more finan-
cial stability is at risk. To analyze bank systemic risk defined in this narrow, synthetic 
sense, as the extent to which the banking system is immune to external shocks, we 
need to rely on a different research methodology. Our theoretical underpinning is 
based on a signal extraction problem à la Lucas, i.e. the simple idea that, in the pres-
ence of informational problems, aggregate shocks can disturb the signal quality of 
prices and distort banks resource allocations in a systematic way (Bernanke and Gert-
ler 1989, Kyotaki and Moore 1997, Beaudry et al. 2001, Vives 2010). To explore this 
kind of conjecture, Baum et al. (2002, 2004, 2009) and Quagliariello (2007, 2009) de-
fine banks herd-like behaviour in terms of loans portfolios cross-sectional dispersion. 
In particular, Baum et al. (2009) find that an increase in macroeconomic uncertainty, 
as measured by the conditional variance of industrial production, generates a signifi-
cant decline in the cross-sectional dispersion of the loans-to-assets ratio after one year. 
More importantly, the authors argue that this kind of herd-like behaviour is robust to 
the way dispersion is defined, whether considering total loans, loans to households, or 
commercial and industrial loans, and even when controlling for monetary regime 
changes, inflation, leading indicators or, incidentally, regulatory changes
5. In other 
words, banks systemic behaviour would be predominantly a cyclical phenomenon. 
In this paper we work along these lines, but we analyze the pattern in the context of 
shadow banking. To better assess banks true systemic risk, we enlarge the investiga-
                                                      
5 As a matter of fact, Baum et al. (2009) find that regulatory changes, more precisely the Basel Accords, seemed to have had a tendency to 
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tion scope and include all banking business activities, not only considering loans, i.e. 
banks traditional activities, but also banks off-balance-sheet (OBS) lines of business, 
and more precisely the share of noninterest income (snonin) generated by OBS activi-
ties
6. We know that informational problems and agency costs are generally more se-
vere during business cycle downturns, when banks are the most exposed to moral haz-
ard and adverse selection. The banking business is typically riskier during contraction 
episodes, because collateral value falls. One important contribution of this paper is 
then to propose a new methodology specifically designed to detect this kind of asym-
metric impact macroeconomic shocks can have on bank systemic risk. Compared to 
Baum et al. (2002, 2004, 2009), our new framework, based on an EGARCH approach 
(Nelson 1991), also provides a more precise account of the relative impact of macro-
economic risk (the first moment), and uncertainty (the second moment).  
Consistent with previous studies, the dataset we use confirms that banks display a 
herd-like behaviour during times of heightened macroeconomic uncertainty, as meas-
ured with the conditional variances of standard series such as GDP and consumer price 
index. However, one advantage of the generalized framework we propose is that it 
helps better identify the phase of the business cycle when the dispersion is at its low-
est. On this dimension, the dynamics of both the loans-to-assets ratio (lta) and nonin-
terest income cross-sectional dispersions suggests that banks behaviour is more ho-
mogenous in downturns. In particular, we find that the volatilities of the innovations of 
the cross-sectional dispersions are lower in downturns, an asymmetric pattern unex-
plored in previous studies. Interestingly, we also find that the loans dispersion seems to 
be relatively more influenced by credit variables (as proxied by macroeconomic condi-
tions), rather than supply factors such as the return on assets (ROA), so that, consistent 
                                                      
6 Note that snonin is only a proxy for OBS activities as some snonin related items are actually accounted on balance sheet.  ©   C CH HR RI IS ST TI IA AN N   C CA AL LM MÈ ÈS S   A AN ND D   R RA AY YM MO ON ND D   T TH HÉ ÉO OR RE ET T, ,   M MA AR RK KE ET T- -O OR RI IE EN NT TE ED D   B BA AN NK KI IN NG G   A AN ND D   B BA AN NK K   S SY YS ST TE EM MI IC C   R RI IS SK K, ,   
0 06 6/ /1 12 2/ /2 20 01 11 1   1 10 0: :2 21 1: :0 00 0   A AM M. .      
  8
with Bikker and Hu (2002)
7, our results would better accord with the balance sheet 
channel than with the traditional credit channel (Bernanke and Gertler 1995, Kashyap 
and Stein 2000).  
A surprising result of our study suggests that, the rise of shadow banking notwith-
standing, banks herd-like behaviour measured with lta cross-sectional dispersion has 
actually diminished – and even so during the subprime crisis. However, we cannot be 
so conclusive about non-traditional activities. Data indicate no clear increase in snonin 
banks cross-sectional dispersion. In fact, our main findings support the idea that the 
cyclicality of bank systemic risk is quite substantial, and that the fluctuations of non-
traditional activities are large during recessions, as obviously evidenced by the 2007-
2009 crisis, when banks collectively put a brake on their OBS activities. In other 
words, the new set of results we provide suggests that, while, on the one hand, banks 
seem more able to deal with aggregate shocks, on the other hand it might be at the cost 
of more severe income volatility episodes, a trade-off worth monitoring more closely 
in the macroprudential analyses of bank systemic risk.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical intuition sup-
porting our hypothesis about the link between macroeconomic uncertainty and the 
cross-sectional dispersion of banks risky assets (on-balance sheet and off-balance-sheet 
related items) and exposes our empirical framework and the EGARCH procedure we 
introduce in our experiments. Section 3 discusses data and basic stylized facts related 
to the cross-sectional dispersions of lta and snonin. In section 4 we report our main re-
sults, and in section 5 we perform robustness checks and provide complementary re-
sults before concluding in section 6.  
                                                      
7 We try several financial variables to represent the supply and demand sides of risky assets like return on asset, short term interest rates, and 
term structure variables such as the spread between long-term and short-term interest rates, and also credit spreads like the difference be-
tween the yields on BBB and AAA bonds and stock index returns. These variables are usually not significant, so we eliminate them from our 
analysis. This observation is in line with Bikker and Hu (2002) findings that financial variables such as money supply and interest rates do 
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2. Empirical framework 
2.1 Risk, uncertainty and the banks herd-like hypothesis 
Many studies document the influence of the first moments of macroeconomic ag-
gregates, i.e., macroeconomic risk, on bank systemic risk (e.g. Barth et al. 1999, Borio 
et al 2001, Bikker and Hu 2002, Bikker and Metzemakers 2005, Baele et al. 2007, 
Wagner 2007, Somoye and Ilo 2009, and Nijskens and Wagner 2011). However, even 
though all moments of the key macroeconomic factors (e.g. GDP growth and inflation) 
are susceptible to influence bank systemic behaviour, so far only few authors looked at 
the role played by their higher moments – i.e., macroeconomic uncertainty. For exam-
ple, we should expect that, in absolute terms, the homogeneity of banks portfolios in-
creases with macroeconomic risk and uncertainty, as both should lead to a decrease in 
the cross-sectional distribution of banks risky assets, i.e. a decrease in the aggregate 
dispersion of banks portfolios. Our first goal is to show that risk and uncertainty have 
precisely this kind of impact in the current market-oriented banking context. To study 
the degree of banks business homogeneity when they adjust to macroeconomic shocks, 
we adopt a research strategy based on the island paradigm developed in Lucas (1973). 
This kind of approach has been successfully applied in many studies, including the 
analyses of the cross-sectional dispersion of firms investments, the financial markets, 
and the banking industry (Beaudry et al. (2001), Baum et al. 2002, 2004, Hwang and 
Salmon 2004, Quagliariello 2007, Vives 2010). It has also been specifically used to 
study how macroeconomic uncertainty affects banks signal about expected returns 
(e.g. Baum et al. 2009 and Quagliariello 2009). In this literature, the main theoretical 
predicament is that greater economic uncertainty hinders banks’ ability to foresee in-
vestment opportunities. The testable prediction which derives from this theory is that ©   C CH HR RI IS ST TI IA AN N   C CA AL LM MÈ ÈS S   A AN ND D   R RA AY YM MO ON ND D   T TH HÉ ÉO OR RE ET T, ,   M MA AR RK KE ET T- -O OR RI IE EN NT TE ED D   B BA AN NK KI IN NG G   A AN ND D   B BA AN NK K   S SY YS ST TE EM MI IC C   R RI IS SK K, ,   
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deteriorating information quality should lead to a narrowing of the cross-sectional dis-
persion of banks portfolios, as banks allocate assets in their portfolio more homoge-
nously when macroeconomic uncertainty increases
8. In this paper we aim at empiri-
cally testing this conjecture – i.e., the banks herd-like hypothesis – to show that banks 
diversification in non-traditional business lines has changed the way in which the 
banking system reacts to external shocks. To do so, we introduce a new empirical 
framework linking banks systemic behaviour to the first and second moments of prox-
ies of risk and uncertainty, as described below.  
 
2.2 The model 
In the new banking environment, macroeconomic shocks can distort the allocation 
of funds to on-balance-sheet items, but to OBS activities as well, and this constitutes a 
new area of potential inefficiency worth investigating. In this paper, we follow Baum 
et al. (2009), and our bank portfolio includes two kinds of assets, a risk-free asset (a 
security) and a risky one. However here, risky assets comprise both loans and off-
balance sheet (OBS) investments. More precisely, to test the herd-like behaviour hy-
pothesis we consider the following reduced-form equation model: 
2
01 2 3 1 j,t mv,t c,mv,t j ,t t disp disp                         (1) 
where  j,t disp  is a variance measure of the cross-sectional dispersion of a risky asset j at 
time t;  mv,t   is the first moment of a macroeconomic variable proxying for risk; 
2
c,mv,t   
is the corresponding conditional variance of the macroeconomic variable
9, i.e. the sec-
ond moment measuring macroeconomic uncertainty; and  t   is the innovation. For in-
stance, the first moment of a macroeconomic variable may be GDP growth and its sec-
                                                      
8 The standard portfolio model used to derive this hypothesis and to establish the relationship between the cross-sectional dispersion of a 
risky asset and macroeconomic uncertainty is discussed  in Appendix 1.  
9 For the construct of the conditional variance series proxying macroeconomic uncertainty, see Appendix 2.  ©   C CH HR RI IS ST TI IA AN N   C CA AL LM MÈ ÈS S   A AN ND D   R RA AY YM MO ON ND D   T TH HÉ ÉO OR RE ET T, ,   M MA AR RK KE ET T- -O OR RI IE EN NT TE ED D   B BA AN NK KI IN NG G   A AN ND D   B BA AN NK K   S SY YS ST TE EM MI IC C   R RI IS SK K, ,   
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ond moment the conditional variance of GDP growth. The model includes the lagged 
dependent variable to control for residuals autocorrelation and account for the adjust-
ment delay of the observed  j,t disp to its target level.  
     Importantly, note that our model makes an explicit distinction between macroeco-
nomic risk and uncertainty, macroeconomic risk relating to the phase of the business 
cycle and macroeconomic uncertainty to its volatility. The first reason explaining this 
choice relates to the main argument of our paper. We strongly suspect that the first 
moments of the macroeconomic variables have a great impact on non-traditional bank-
ing activities, whereas the second moments manly influence traditional business lines. 
On the one hand, we can hypothesize that OBS activities are relatively more immune 
to macroeconomic uncertainty than loans because they are more easily hedged. Indeed, 
financial structured products, which weigh heavily in OBS activities, are designed to 
manage volatility – the raison d’être of derivatives – and to improve financial markets 
risk-sharing. On the other hand however, and quite importantly, given their high de-
gree of liquidity we conjecture that OBS activities are relatively more sensitive to the 
business cycle, so that the cyclicality of bank systemic risk is actually quite substantial 
(Lucas and Stokey 2011).  
         A second, more technical motivation for including both the first and second mo-
ments in equation (1) is that, from an econometric perspective, the first moment of a 
variable used to define macroeconomic uncertainty must also be included for the sake 
of robustness (Huizinga 1993, Quagliariello, 2007, 2009). As a matter of fact, exclud-
ing the first moment might wrongfully lead the researcher to attribute to the second 
moment an impact which is actually explained by the first one. 
        In line with previous studies, we analyze the impact of one macroeconomic factor 
at a time. For example, for the dispersion of lta in terms of GDP uncertainty, our mod-©   C CH HR RI IS ST TI IA AN N   C CA AL LM MÈ ÈS S   A AN ND D   R RA AY YM MO ON ND D   T TH HÉ ÉO OR RE ET T, ,   M MA AR RK KE ET T- -O OR RI IE EN NT TE ED D   B BA AN NK KI IN NG G   A AN ND D   B BA AN NK K   S SY YS ST TE EM MI IC C   R RI IS SK K, ,   
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el can be expressed as follows: 
  01 3 4 5 6 1 tt t t t t t disp(lta) cv_ gdp dln gdp output _ gap dtl disp(lta)                (2) 
where disp(lta) is the cross-sectional dispersion of lta, cv_gdp, the conditional variance 
of GDP growth, dln(gdp), the rate of growth of GDP, output_gap is the output gap 
measured as the deviation of the logarithm of real GDP from its Hodrick-Prescott 
trend, and dtl is an aggregate measure of the degree of total leverage
10. According to 
the theory, we expect the sign of  1   to be negative: an increase in macroeconomic un-
certainty measured by the conditional variance of GDP growth should decrease 
disp(lta), and thus increase herding. The next two variables appearing in Equation (2) 
are two first moments associated with the conditional variance: the GDP growth and 
the output gap. The former is a measure of the strength of economic growth, while the 
latter is a measure of the business cycle. We expect the signs of the coefficients of the-
se variables to be both positive. Indeed, when macroeconomic risk increases, i.e. when 
GDP growth and output gap decrease, banks should behave more homogeneously, as 
they do in the case of increased macroeconomic uncertainty. In this model version, we 
also introduce a variable to control for the risk of the banking industry, namely the de-
gree of total leverage (dtl)
11. Our experiments show that this elasticity measure of lev-
erage is more representative of bank risk than the standard accounting leverage meas-
ures such as the ratio of assets to equity or the mandatory leverage recommended in 
Basel I and II
12. For example, contrary to most standard measures, the dtl suggests that 
embedded bank leverage was increasing during the 2002-2007 period, while financial 
institution were expanding their OBS activities, and indicates a deleveraging process 
                                                      
10 Note that we also examined other macroeconomic and financial variables but these factors do not improve the fit of the model. For exam-
ple, authors often rely on the conditional variance of industrial production to model macroeconomic uncertainty but in our set-up this vari-
able performs badly relative to GDP. Other “indirect” macroeconomic variables like firms’ inventories, unemployment rate, leading indica-
tors and the rate of industrial capacity are also found weakly significant in our framework.  
11 For the construction of this variable (a measure of banks time-varying leverage obtained with the Kalman filter) see Calmès and Théoret 
(2011a).  
12 Note that the additional leverage measure proposed in Basel III remains close to the conventional ratio of assets to equity, a measure 
which, like the existing mandatory indicators does not track bank risk effectively (Calmès and Théoret 2011a).  ©   C CH HR RI IS ST TI IA AN N   C CA AL LM MÈ ÈS S   A AN ND D   R RA AY YM MO ON ND D   T TH HÉ ÉO OR RE ET T, ,   M MA AR RK KE ET T- -O OR RI IE EN NT TE ED D   B BA AN NK KI IN NG G   A AN ND D   B BA AN NK K   S SY YS ST TE EM MI IC C   R RI IS SK K, ,   
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after 2007, as banks were decreasing their risk to recover. Ceteris paribus, to the extent 
that the herd-like hypothesis has some support, 5  , the coefficient of dtl should be 
negative, banks adopting a more homogenous behaviour in times of increasing risk.  
In order to estimate disp(lta) with a smoothed version of the conditional variance 
of the GDP growth, we also run Equation (2) using the weighted conditional variance 
measure of GDP growth (cv_gdp_w)
13, whereas, in the third version of our model, the 
dispersion of lta is expressed in terms of inflation uncertainty and reads as follows: 
         01 2 3 4 5 6 1 tt t t t t t t disp(lta) cv_inf dln gdp output _ gap inf dtl disp(lta)                  (3) 
where cv_inf is the conditional variance of inflation and inf, the inflation rate, is the 
first moment associated with the conditional variance of inflation. Similar to the case 
of the conditional variance of GDP growth, we expect a negative sign for 1  , the coef-
ficient associated with inflation uncertainty. We also expect the coefficient associated 
with the inflation rate, 4  , to be negative since inflation distorts the signal given by rel-
ative prices (Beaudry et al. 2001).  
We then perform the same three estimations for the cross-sectional dispersion of 
snonin, i.e. the cross-sectional dispersion of the risky assets associated with OBS ac-
tivities.  
 
2.3. The EGARCH estimation methods 
To estimate the three versions of our canonical model, we choose to rely on an 
EGARCH approach using standard tests (Franses and Van Dijk 2000) because, as the 
literature suggests, the standard OLS estimation method does not properly treat the in-
novation conditional heteroskedasticity. Relatedly, relying on OLS delivers mild re-
sults, especially regarding the impact of the first moments of the macroeconomic vari-
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ables
14. The choice of this EGARCH methodology is also motivated by the fact that 
the standard GARCH (p,q) does not rigorously account for the asymmetries encoun-
tered in many times series. For instance, bad news ( 0 ti    ) have generally a bigger 
impact (i.e. a leverage effect) on financial returns volatility than good news ( 0 ti    ), 
and an unexpected drop in returns (bad news) tend to increase the volatility more than 
an unexpected rise in returns (good news) of a similar magnitude (Black 1976). In this 
respect, we suspect that imposing a symmetry constraint on the conditional variance of 
past innovations might be too restrictive, and actually inappropriate. Consequently, to 
account for the likely asymmetric impact of good news and bad news on the condi-
tional volatility of the cross-sectional dispersion innovations, we follow Nelson (1991) 
and introduce an equation such that: 
 
22 11












         (4) 





 and q 
lags to   
2
t log  . In this equation, good news,  0 ti    , and bad news,  0 ti    , can 
have differential effects on the conditional variance. The EGARCH model is asymmet-









 is included with a θ1 coefficient. There is asymmetry if  1   
is significantly different from 0.  In particular, bad news have a leverage effect on the 
volatility if  1 0   , and this effect is exponential since the variance is estimated in log-
arithm
15. To summarize, our EGARCH approach differs from a regular GARCH set-up 
in two main respects: (i) the EGARCH model allows good news and bad news to have 
a different impact on volatility, and (ii) the EGARCH model allows important news to 
                                                      
14 OLS results are reported in Appendix 3.  
15 By contrast, in the threshold ARCH (i.e. TARCH) model, an alternative way to account for the asymmetric properties of the conditional 
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have a proportionally greater impact than the standard GARCH model (Engle and Ng 
1993). 
We estimate the model versions for lta and snonin using this EGARCH procedure, 
but we also rely on EGARCH with instruments since the conditional variances of our 
macroeconomic variables and the dtl series are generated variables, i.e. potentially 
noisy proxies of their associated unobservable regressors (Pagan 1984, 1986). Indeed, 
even if relying on OLS or simple maximum likelihood in the presence of generated 
variables does not lead to inconsistency in the estimation procedure, the t tests associ-
ated with the estimated coefficients are however invalid (the F tests or Wald tests on 
groups of coefficients still remaining valid, Pagan 1984, 1986). This issue is mentioned 
in previous studies (e.g. Beaudry et al. 2001, Baum et al. 2002, 2004, 2009, Quaglia-
riello 2007, 2009) but, to our knowledge, it has not been fully addressed before. Ac-
cordingly, we adopt a comprehensive approach by first regressing the generated vari-
ables on instruments, including the predetermined variables, and also, as suggested by 
Fuller (1987) and Lewbel (1997), the higher moments of the models explanatory vari-
ables. The second estimation method we use is thus a standard EGARCH with instru-
ments, or an IV-EGARCH, in which the generated variables cv_gdp, cv_gdp_w, cv_inf 
and dtl are explicitly considered endogenous.  
 
3. Data and some key stylized facts  
  In this paper we are not interested by extreme events such as liquidity crises. To 
analyse crises episodes and the complete disruption of the banking system, authors 
usually investigate the testable implications of the contagion theory, whereby a signal 
triggers a bank run, in a cascade-herding traditional sense (Morris and Shin 2000, Lu-
cas and Stokey 2011). Since we focus instead on the regular reaction of the banking ©   C CH HR RI IS ST TI IA AN N   C CA AL LM MÈ ÈS S   A AN ND D   R RA AY YM MO ON ND D   T TH HÉ ÉO OR RE ET T, ,   M MA AR RK KE ET T- -O OR RI IE EN NT TE ED D   B BA AN NK KI IN NG G   A AN ND D   B BA AN NK K   S SY YS ST TE EM MI IC C   R RI IS SK K, ,   
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system to the business cycle, it is desirable to rely on a dataset in which crises have a 
relatively mild impact. In this respect, a Canadian sample appears to be one of the best 
choices available. Indeed, as Bordo et al. (2011) argue, thanks to its domestic regula-
tion design, the Canadian banking system has been relatively immune to the subprime 
crisis and to the former financial turmoils as well. Consequently, to better isolate the 
impact of market-oriented banking on systemic risk, it is particularly instructive to 
look at Canadian data. If we find that the changes in the banking environment have in-
deed some influence on banks usual response to macroeconomic shocks, then we 
should expect that market-oriented banking has a fortiori significantly changed bank 
risk in other countries, especially those which were the most hit by the recent crisis.  
Accordingly, the sample we chose is derived from Canadian data and runs from 
the first fiscal quarter of 1997 to the second fiscal quarter of 2010. We study the cross-
sectional dispersion of the risky assets of the six major Canadian banks on quarterly 
data so that we have fifty-four observations, a reasonable number to perform standard 
time series analysis. Our dataset is based on statistics provided by the Canadian Bank-
ers Association, the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, and the 
Bank of Canada; and the macroeconomic time series come from CANSIM, a database 
managed by Statistics Canada. Taken together, the six major domestic banks account 
for about 90 percent of the banking business. All the banks we analyze are chartered 
banks, i.e. commercial banks regulated by the Bank Act, running a broad range of ac-
tivities, from loan business to investment banking, fiduciary services, financial advice, 
insurance and securitization.  
Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 here 
Regarding the basic statistics, first note that the banks aggregate loans-to-assets ra-
tio displays a decreasing trend (Figure 1). In the first quarter of 1997 the lta ratio is ©   C CH HR RI IS ST TI IA AN N   C CA AL LM MÈ ÈS S   A AN ND D   R RA AY YM MO ON ND D   T TH HÉ ÉO OR RE ET T, ,   M MA AR RK KE ET T- -O OR RI IE EN NT TE ED D   B BA AN NK KI IN NG G   A AN ND D   B BA AN NK K   S SY YS ST TE EM MI IC C   R RI IS SK K, ,   
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equal to 63%, but in the first quarter of 2010 it decreases to 54% after a low of 47% in 
the second quarter of 2009 (at the peak of the subprime crisis). Relatedly, and opposite 
to the lta pattern, snonin, our proxy for OBS activities has a tendency to increase over 
the sample period (Figure 2). The ratio is equal to 43% at the beginning of the period 
but in the third quarter of 2007 it rises to 55%. This new trend in banking has first been 
identified by Boyd and Gertler (1994) for the U.S., and then further analyzed for many 
countries, including in the now famous Rajan’s papers (2005, 2006)
16. The literature 
suggests that pari passu with the development of this market-oriented trend bank risk  
has increased (e.g., Stiroh 2004, Stiroh and Rumble 2006, Baele et al. 2007, Wagner 
2007, 2008 and 2010, Lepetit  et al. 2008, Shin 2009). More precisely, authors find 
that non-traditional business lines have spurred the volatility of bank income over the 
last decades. Relatedly, it is also widely believed that bank risk is increasingly associ-
ated with the growth in off-balance-sheet activities, (Adrian and Shin 2009, Calmès 
and Théoret 2010, Cardone et al. 2010, Nijkens and Wagner 2011).  
Insert Figure 3 here 
In this context, the question is then to assess the kind of impact this change in 
banking has on systemic behaviour. In this respect, Figure 3 provides a first evidence, 
showing the behaviour of the cross-sectional dispersions of the loans-to-assets ratio, 
disp(lta), and of the share of noninterest income in operating revenues, disp(snonin), 
from the first fiscal quarter of 1997 to the second fiscal quarter of 2010. The time se-
ries are obtained by computing the cross-sectional variances of the loans-to-assets ratio 
(lta) and of the share of noninterest income (snonin) over the six banks for every quar-
ter. According to the evolution of the cross-sectional dispersion of lta, banks seem to 
display an increase in herd-like behaviour over the period 1997-2002, but the trend 
steadely reverses after 2002 (Figure 3). Surprisingly, this disp(lta) upward trend actu-
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ally persists, even during the last crisis. This constitutes preliminary evidence that the 
banks traditional business has in fact become increasingly resilient, i.e. better immune 
to external shocks. On other respect, a first glance at the series also reveals that the 
cross-sectional dispersion of lta might be sensitive to the output gap. More precisely, 
the cross-sectional dispersion of lta seems positively correlated with the output gap, 
and this could suggest a priori more herd-like behaviour in bad times than in good 
times. Note that this observation is not merely anecdotical since this kind of pattern is 
much susceptible to increase banking procyclicality (Figure 3).  
More importantly, note that, compared to what obtains with lta, the trend of the 
cross-sectional dispersion of snonin is less pronounced over the whole sample period, 
and strikingly drops after 2007, suggesting more herd-like behaviour in terms of non-
traditional activities. This volatility pattern is consistent with the studies arguing that 
financial innovations tend to increase herding (e.g. Heiss 2005, Wagner 2008, Naka-
gawa and Uchida 2011). Relatedly, the cross-sectional dispersion of snonin appears to 
be both more volatile and sensitive to the business cycle than the dispersion of lta, es-
pecially during recessions, when the banking system is the least resilient. For example, 
during the last subprime crisis, a significant portion of securitized assets flowed back 
on balance sheets and most of the credit commitments were also exercised. This kind 
of response suggests that banks OBS activities might contract more than traditional 
business lines during bad times. Finally, one curious pattern which seems to emerge 
from Figure 3 is that the drops in the cross-sectional dispersion of snonin could pre-
date economic downturns
17.  
Insert Figure 4 and Figure 5 here 
Another way of directly detecting herd-like behaviour is to examine the cyclical 
                                                      
17 That might be due to the fact that noninterest income is much related to stock market indices, which lead economic activity (Calmès and 
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profile of the variance of the banking variables at stake. If we find that the variances 
move procyclically, this could constitute an additional evidence of a cyclical conver-
gence in banking practices. Figures 4 and 5 provide the moving average variances of 
the level and logarithm of banks loans and noninterest income, respectively. In these 
figures we also plot as a benchmark the variances of the unscaled loans and noninterest 
income variables. Captured this way, herding appears to be predominantly a cyclical 
phenomenon, as there seems to be a regular decrease in the rolling variances of loans 
and noninterest income, either prior or during contractions. Moreover, note that consis-
tent with the findings of Calmès and Liu (2009) and Calmès and Théoret (2010, 
2011b), we can detect a regime change in loans and non-interest income volatility after 
1996. Insofar as the variances of loans and noninterest income may be used as indica-
tors of banks systemic behaviour, data indicate a decrease in herding after 1997, the 
volatilities of loans and noninterest income being much more pronounced after this 
date. Actually, consistent with what Figure 3 suggests, since that date, economic 
downturns seem to be preceded by variances surge.  
 
4. Results 
    Table 1 provides the estimation results for the model versions based on the 
EGARCH estimation without instruments. Columns (1) to (3) report the results of the 
model estimation for the two dependent variables, the cross-sectional dispersions of lta 
and snonin.  
Insert Table 1 here 
4.1. The lta and snonin cross-sectional dispersions 
  Column (1) of Table 1 displays the estimation results for Equation (2) and con-
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sion of the loans-to-assets ratio, disp(lta). The estimated coefficient of cv_gdp is equal 
to -0.79 and significant at the 1% level, and the coefficient of the weighted conditional 
variance of GDP growth, cv_gdp_w,  is even greater in absolute value, at -2.65, and 
significant at the 5% level (Column (2)), a result which suggests a delay in the ad-
justement of disp(lta) to macroeconomic uncertainty.  
  Note that the level of economic growth also increases disp(lta), confirming that 
banks systemic behaviour is more homogenous in economic downturns. Furthermore, 
the estimated coefficient of dln(gdp) is equal to 0.83 and significant at the 10% level, 
while the coefficient of output_gap is equal to 91.73 and significant at the 1% level. 
According to these results, the first moments seem to play a greater role on herding 
than reported in previous studies. Indeed, Quagliariello (2009) finds that the control 
variables accounting for aggregate economic activity or inflation (i.e. first moments) 
do not have a significant impact on the cross-sectional variability of the share that 
banks invest in risky loans. Similarly, in Baum et al. (2002, 2004), the control vari-
ables also play a minor role in the OLS estimations. In this respect, the new results we 
derive from our framework differ. One plausible reason explaining why the first mo-
ments are more significant in our case relates to the homoskedaticy hypothesis embed-
ded in previous studies. Indeed, to our knowledge, the conditional variance of the 
equation innovations has never been explicitly specified before.  
  Equation (2) also delivers interesting results on clustering patterns when consider-
ing bank risk, as measured with our indicator of bank degree of total leverage, dtl. As 
expected, column (1) of Table 1 shows that an increase in dtl decreases disp(lta), the 
estimated coefficient being equal to -5.10 and significant at the 1% level. This result 
supports the view that banks behaviour is more homogenous when bank risk increases, 
and it is also broadly consistent with the impact of increases in macroeconomic risk ©   C CH HR RI IS ST TI IA AN N   C CA AL LM MÈ ÈS S   A AN ND D   R RA AY YM MO ON ND D   T TH HÉ ÉO OR RE ET T, ,   M MA AR RK KE ET T- -O OR RI IE EN NT TE ED D   B BA AN NK KI IN NG G   A AN ND D   B BA AN NK K   S SY YS ST TE EM MI IC C   R RI IS SK K, ,   
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and uncertainty on disp(lta)
18. With a coefficient of the lagged dependent variable at 
0.59, and significant at the 1% level, column (1) also reveals that herd-like behaviour 
is a persistent phenomenon (Haiss 2005, Nakagawa and Uchida 2011). One explana-
tion sometimes evoked in the literature relates to the Abilene paradox (Harvey 1974), a 
kind of “mimetic isomorphism”, i.e. groupthink strategy characterized by copycat 
banking practices.  
  Column (3) of Table 1 reports the corresponding results for Equation (3), the mod-
el including inflation as the proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty. Consistent with our 
hypothesis of a negative link between the dispersion of the risky assets and uncer-
tainty, the estimated coefficient of cv_inf is negative, at -10.97 and significant at the 
1% level. Inflation has also the expected negative impact on disp(lta), its estimated co-
efficient being equal to  -1.27 and significant at the 5% level. These results support the 
argument of Beaudry et al. (2001) and the idea that inflation generates noisy market 
signals and increases clustering. In other respects, considering inflation instead of GDP 
growth does not qualitatively alter the role played by economic growth. In particular, 
the coefficient of dln(gdp) nearly doubles from 0.83 to 1.65 between the two specifica-
tions, and the coefficient of the output gap is also positive, at 60.40, and significant at 
the 1% level.  
 Regarding  market-oriented  activities, given that they also relate to risky invest-
ments, we should anticipate that banks behave vis-à-vis snonin in the same way they 
do with traditional activities. Table 1 largely qualifies this expectation. In particular, 
economic uncertainty, as measured with the conditional variance of GDP (or inflation) 
decreases disp(snonin). For example, the coefficient of cv_gdp is estimated at -1.09 
and significant at the 1% level. More importantly, note that weighting the conditional 
                                                      
18 If, instead of dtl, we use a conventional measure of leverage like the ratio of assets to equity, the estimated coefficient is also nega-
tive, although not significant at the usual thresholds. 
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variance of GDP growth does not improve the results in this case, the estimated coeffi-
cient of cv_gdp_w being equal to -2.07, but only significant at the 10% level (col-
umn(2)). Relatedly, when cv_gdp is used as the uncertainty proxy, the estimated coef-
ficient of the lagged dependent variable is equal to 0.18, a lower level than the corre-
sponding 0.59 obtained for disp(lta). This set of results suggests that disp(snonin) is 
less persistent than disp(lta), a phenomenon which can be explained by the faster reac-
tion of OBS activities to economic activity and macroeconomic uncertainty. This dy-
namic property is consistent with both the relative volatility of snonin cross-sectional 
dispersion, and the greater liquidity of non-traditional activities. For instance, loans 
which are securitized generally display a high degree of liquidity, and their adjustment 
to the desired value is thus arguably faster than for their on-balance-sheet counterparts.  
Quite strikingly, note that disp(snonin) appears much more sensitive to inflation 
uncertainty than lta. As a matter of fact, the coefficient of cv_inf is estimated at -49.20 
and significant at the 1% level, while the corresponding coefficient for disp(lta) is 
equal to -10.97 and significant at the 5% level
19 (column (3)). Furthermore, and, again, 
much more so than for disp(lta), economic growth significantly increases disp(snonin), 
regardless of the macroeconomic factor proxying for uncertainty. For instance, with 
the conditional variance of GDP growth, the estimated coefficient of the output gap is 
equal to 287.26 and significant at the 1% level, whereas the corresponding coefficient 
for disp(lta), at 91.73, is much lower (column(1)). In fact, for all the exogenous vari-
able considered, both those related to risk and to uncertainty, the results confirm our 
stylized facts, namely the fact that the herding associated with non-traditional activities 
appears more sensitive to macroeconomic shocks than it is the case for disp(lta). Re-
mark that these findings cannot obtain with the usual OLS approach, but our EGARCH 
                                                      
19 Note that the coefficients of the disp(lta) and disp(snonin) equations are directly comparable for a given explanatory variable since the 
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estimations clearly reveal that, while banks seem able to deal with the external shocks 
hitting their loan business, at the same time, their non-traditional activities appear to be 
both quite volatile and sensitive to the business cycle
20.   
Interestingly, the behaviours of disp(lta) and disp(snonin) also differ with respect 
to dtl, our control variable for bank risk. Contrary to the disp(lta) results, an increase in 
dtl leads to a corresponding increase in disp(snonin). The estimated coefficient of dtl is 
positive and significant at the 1% level, regardless of the way we proxy for macroeco-
nomic uncertainty. For instance, it is equal to 18.86 when cv_gdp is used to measure 
uncertainty, and to 23.82 with cv_inf. Relatedly, dtl and snonin positively comove and 
an increase in snonin corresponds to an increase in risk as measured by dtl (Calmès 
and Théoret 2011a). Furthermore, according to the data, when snonin  increases, 
disp(snonin) also tends to increase. This might actually explain the positive comove-
ment observed between dtl and disp(snonin). When dtl increases, banks have a ten-
dency to decrease their lta ratio, but not necessarily their OBS activities. Authors usu-
ally resort to a regulatory capital arbitrage (RCA) argument to explain this opposite re-
action to leverage (Jones 2000, Calomiris and Mason 2004, Ambrose et al. 2005, Kling 
2009, Brunnermeier 2009, Cardone et al. 2010, Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson, Vives 
2010). When dtl increases, i.e. bank risk rises, it may be due to an increase in snonin or 
a decrease in bank liquidity ratio but, in any case, banks are induced to off-load risk 
from on-balance-sheet to off-balance-sheet in order to generate new capital or addi-
tional liquidities
21. Ceteris paribus, this transfer tends to decrease disp(lta) and lta, and 
to increase disp(snonin) and snonin.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
To compare more precisely the relative power of our exogenous factors, Table 2 
                                                      
20 This observation nicely complements the seminal view that advances in risk management have essentially led to greater credit availability 
rather than reduced banking riskiness (Cebenoyan and Strahan 2004, Instefjord 2005).   
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reports the estimated short-term and long-term elasticities of disp(lta) and 
disp(snonin)
22. When using cv_gdp_w as the uncertainty proxy, the elasticity of 
disp(lta) is equal to -0.12 in the short-run, but more than doubles in the long-run, at       
-0.29,  a result in line with other studies (Baum et al. 2002, 2004, 2009). This confirms 
that even if banks can adopt different strategies in the way they manage their tradi-
tional portfolio, they consistently tend to follow the same kind of adjustment to deal 
with macroeconomic shocks. By comparison, the elasticity of disp(snonin) to GDP un-
certainty is lower, at -0.04 in the short-run and -0.05 in the long-run. This result sug-
gests that, as expected, banks herd-like behaviour is relatively more sensitive to uncer-
tainty when monitored with loans than with OBS activities. Indeed, as mentioned ear-
lier, the latter should be relatively more immune to uncertainty than risk since the vola-
tility of OBS activities is, by definition, easier to hedge. More importantly however, 
these elasticities also confirm that market-oriented banking is particularly sensitive to 
macroeconomic risk relative to traditional banking, a phenomenon which should de-
serve serious attention in the conduct of macroprudential policy.   
Relatedly, our elasticity computations suggest that, consistent with Beaudry et al. 
(2001) intuition, market-oriented activities are much influenced by inflation uncer-
tainty, likely because of the close negative link between inflation and stock markets 
performance (Calmès and Théoret 2011b). In other words, ceteris paribus, when faced 
with heightened inflation uncertainty, banks also tend to herd more in terms of non-
traditional business lines than with their loan portfolios. Note also that the long-run 
elasticity of disp(lta) with respect to dtl, at -1.12, is higher than 1 in absolute value, 
whereas the long-run elasticity of disp(snonin) with respect to dtl is also quite high, at 
                                                      




 , where coef is the estimated coefficient of X, and  X  
and  Y  are respectively the average of Xt and Yt computed over the sample period. The long-term elasticity is computed by multiplying the 
short-term elasticity by 
1
1  
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0.87, but with the opposite sign. This finding clearly confirms that the positive impact 
of a 1% increase of dtl on disp(snonin) is in fact mostly counterbalanced by the nega-
tive influence of this increase on disp(lta). As a consequence, we should conclude that 
RCA unlikely exerts a meaningful influence on banks clustering in the long-run, or, to 
be more exact, that regulatory regime changes have only weakly persistent effects on 
banks systemic risk.     
  
4.2. The volatility of the cross-sectional dispersions 
  The bottom of Table 1 reports the estimation results of the EGARCH processes 
followed by the residuals of our dependent variables (Equation(4)). To our knowledge, 
this modelization is a novelty in the literature. We experimented with several GARCH 
processes and selected the EGARCH given its superior fit in terms of the usual tests. 
Globally, our results indicate that omitting to specify the innovation volatility indeed 
provides weaker fits
23. The omission of the residuals specification in the studies based 
on OLS, GARCH and GMM estimations might actually explain why authors often find 
no significant role for the first moments of the explanatory variables (i.e. macroeco-
nomic risk).  
Regarding the results, first note that, for disp(lta), the estimated asymmetry coeffi-
cient  1   of the EGARCH(1,1) is close to 1 and significant at the usual levels, regard-
less of the macroeconomic uncertainty factor considered (Table 1). In other words, 
good news
24 have a positive leverage effect on disp(lta) volatility, so the volatility of 
disp(lta) is actually greater when disp(lta) increases. We observe the same phenome-
non with disp(snonin). In fact, the asymmetry coefficient is close to one for all the un-
                                                      
23 The OLS estimations are discussed in Appendix 3. 
24 Note that news are considered good or bad according to the sign of the innovation. We refer to good news when the innovation of disp(lta) 
is positive and to bad news when the innovation is negative. Indeed, our results indicate that disp(lta) increases with good news, as measured 
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certainty factors we consider. In this sense, our results are coherent in terms of the es-
timated volatilities of disp(lta) and disp(snonin). There is a significant asymmetry in 
the volatility processes of these two variables, this asymmetry is both positive and 
high, and it is robust to the various exogenous factors examined. Note that, since in 
economic downturns, the volatilities of disp(lta) and disp(snonin) shrink pari passu 
with the dispersions, these results lead us to conclude that the procyclicality of 
disp(lta) and disp(snonin) might actually be greater than previously reported.  
    
5. Robustness checks and complementary results 
5.1. The IV-EGARCH estimation results 
In our framework, we introduce as generated or endogenous variables a measure of 
bank risk, dtl, and the conditional variances of the two macroeconomic variables we 
use to define macroeconomic uncertainty. To tackle the econometric difficulty posed 
by this kind of generated variables, we regress each of them on instruments before ap-
plying the EGARCH to the models. However doing so leaves our results essentially 
unchanged. In particular, the results of the IV-EGARCH estimations show that, in the 
regressions with disp(lta) as  the  dependent variable, the impact of cd_gdp and 
cv_gdp_w decreases somewhat but remains significant at the 1% level (Table 3). How-
ever, the sensitivity of disp(lta) to cv_inf, even if it remains negative, is no longer sig-
nificant when using instruments. Without instruments, the coefficient of cv_inf is equal 
to -10.97 and significant at the 5% level, while with the IV-EGARCH the coefficient is 
equal to -3.55 and is no longer significant at the usual thresholds. This suggests that, 
for disp(lta),  the macroeconomic uncertainty measured with the growth of GDP might 
be a more appropriate variable than the inflation proxy
25.  
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By contrast, consistent with Beaudry et al. (2001) argument, the IV-EGARCH 
confirms that disp(snonin) is quite sensitive to inflation uncertainty. Indeed, the impact 
of  cv_inf  on  disp(snonin) decreases somewhat from -49.20 to -27.44 with the IV-
EGARCH, but it remains significant at the 5% level, contrary to what obtains with 
disp(lta) (Table 3).  
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
5.2. The cross-sectional covariances 
Previous studies often consider that the risky assets cross-sectional dispersions 
completely characterize banks comovements. Authors also assume that when disper-
sion decreases, banks herd-like behaviour necessarily accentuates. However, in some 
situations this hypothesis might be misleading, and it could be necessary to look at 
complementary statistics. In this respect, one additional indicator useful to monitor 
bank systemic patterns is the assets cross-sectional covariance (Adrian 2007). This fi-





ij , j i
cov( X ) X X X X
NN 
 
  , where 
N is the number of banks analyzed, Xi is the risky asset to total assets ratio (lta or 
snonin) of bank i, and  X  is the cross-sectional mean of X computed over the banks. 
This statistics indicates the extent to which the (Xi, Xj) pairs comove in each time pe-
riod.  
Insert Figure 6 here 
  Data show that, over the whole 1997-2010 period, the correlation between disp(lta) 
and  cov(lta) is equal to -0.55, and the correlation between disp(snonin) and 
cov(snonin) is higher, at -0.91. Both statistics are significant at the 1% level. The 
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dicators of the lta and snonin respective covariances (comovements). To illustrate the 
relationship between the cross-sectional dispersions and covariances, Figure 6 provides 
the scatter diagrams of disp(lta) and disp(snonin) with their respective cross-sectional 
covariance. The negative colinearity between disp(lta) and cov(lta) appears quite high, 
except for high values of disp(lta) for which the relationship deteriorates. According to 
the dated dots of the scatter diagram, these extreme values are mostly associated with 
the subprime crisis of 2007-2009 and its aftermath. The cross-sectional covariance of 
lta increases from the third quarter of 2009 to the second quarter of 2010, while the 
corresponding cross-sectional dispersion is at historical highs. This suggests that the 
cross-sectional dispersion is actually an incomplete indicator of the comovement of 
banks lta ratios during this kind of extreme episodes. Consistent with the correlations, 
for snonin the observation dots relating the cross-sectional covariances to the cross-
sectional dispersions are more aligned with the regression line. However, there is also 
a deterioration in the year 2008, and a closer look at the scatter diagram reveals that the 
relationship between disp(snonin) and cov(snonin) might have shifted somewhat dur-
ing the crisis, as the comovements are accompanied by larger dispersions. Summariz-
ing, the cross-sectional dispersions of lta and snonin are generally realiable indicators, 
but they may nevertheless be insufficient when the cross-sectional covariances are ig-
nored, especially so for contraction episodes.  
Since herd-like behaviour is arguably more pronounced in downturns, the addi-
tional information conveyed by these cross-sectional covariances can prove to be a 
useful complement to track bank systemic patterns. In particular, we can suspect that if 
a cross-sectional covariance diverges from its associated cross-sectional dispersion, 
this might signal a stronger banking resilience. In this respect, one way to interpret the 
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sion and covariance of the series, is that, on this dimension, the pattern again suggests 
more herding vis-à-vis non-traditional activities. This final result  is consistent with the 
view that, in the new banking era, systemic risk might stem more from market-oriented 





  Previous studies on bank risk have focused on traditional activities, essentially 
lending. In this article we enlarge the analysis by integrating market-oriented banking 
activities, which have now become a major source of bank income. The results we ob-
tain are robust to the addition of banks new business lines. In particular, when con-
fronted to increased macroeconomic uncertainty, banks adopt a more homogenous be-
haviour vis-à-vis both their traditional and market-oriented activities. Baum et al. 
(2002, 2004) show that banks collective behaviour with respect to their risky assets is 
robust to the composition of loans portfolios, and not a result specific to aggregate 
loans
26. We show that this pattern also obtains for assets whose cash-flows are nonin-
terest income. What we find is that banks herd-like behaviour is mostly observed in 
contraction periods for both risky assets. In these episodes, the first and second mo-
ments associated with GDP growth play a similar role, and accentuate banks collective 
appetite, away from risky assets, i.e. loans and OBS activities, and towards liquidity. 
More precisely, in contractions, the output gap (i.e. first moment) decreases, the vola-
tility of GDP growth (second moment) increases, and both variables decrease the 
cross-sectional dispersions of lta and snonin.  
                                                      
26 Baum et al. (2002, 2004) analyze aggregate loans and their components, i.e. three types of risky assets, namely real estate loans, household 
loans, and commercial and industrial loans. The authors find that bank clustering prevails not only for aggregate loans but also for these 
components. Their results are particularly prevalent for real estate loans, whose cross-sectional dispersion increases sharply over the period 
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However, a comparison of lta and snonin statistics also reveals that herding might 
be more prevalent for non-traditional activities, and thus that, ceteris paribus, banking 
fragility could increasingly stem from market-oriented banking. In this respect, our 
main results support the view that, in the new banking era, banking stability and sys-
temic risk are more related to OBS activities than to the traditional loan business lines. 
In particular, in the context of shadow banking, the fact that the cross-sectional disper-
sion of snonin appears quite sensitive to economic downturns might be a new source of 
concern for policy-makers. The assets involved in OBS activities, like securitized as-
sets, are more liquid than loans, and can flow back quickly on balance sheet, precipitat-
ing the decrease in these activities during contractions. We find that banks’ snonin ac-
tually tend to converge rapidly during contractions, which indeed implies major banks 
portfolios reshufflings. The strong sensitivity to the business cycle phase (first mo-
ment) of the cross-sectional dispersion of snonin likely relates to first-order demand-
side effects emanating from the buyers of the short-term debts financing the securitized 
assets, from the lenders of the repo market
27, and from firms exercising massively their 
credit commitments during contractions. For example, the buyers of the special in-
vestment vehicles (SIV) short-term debt can provoke a technical run in time of liquid-
ity shortage simply by not rolling over their investments (Vives 2010, Gennaioli et al. 
2011). The sponsor banks are then simultaneously forced to recuperate the SIV’s assets 
on their balance sheets, and securitization thus creates a strong correlation in the re-
turns of intermediaries in bad times. In the same vein, there can be a surge in firms’ 
bank credit commitments during expansions, but they have to be eventually followed 
by a massive commitments exercise during contractions, a boomerang effect amplify-
ing the cyclicality of snonin cross-sectional dispersion.  
                                                      
27 The repo market induces banks to reshuffle their OBS activities in periods of contractions or liquidity shortages. According to Lucas and 
Stokey (2011), the repo market pools cash reserves, like other forms of fractional reserve banking. A pillar of market-based financing, this 
market shrinks heavily during contractions, and especially during liquidity crises, a phenomenon indirectly captured in our framework by the 
major decrease in the cross-sectional dispersion of snonin observed during financial turmoils.  ©   C CH HR RI IS ST TI IA AN N   C CA AL LM MÈ ÈS S   A AN ND D   R RA AY YM MO ON ND D   T TH HÉ ÉO OR RE ET T, ,   M MA AR RK KE ET T- -O OR RI IE EN NT TE ED D   B BA AN NK KI IN NG G   A AN ND D   B BA AN NK K   S SY YS ST TE EM MI IC C   R RI IS SK K, ,   
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These demand-side effects must be distinguished from the impact of macroeco-
nomic uncertainty (the second moment) on banks systemic behaviour. We find that the 
dispersion of snonin seems relatively less sensitive to macroeconomic uncertainty than 
the dispersion of lta. In this respect, while many studies indicate that the rising share of 
OBS activities in banks total operations is associated with an increase in the volatility 
of bank performance (Calmès and Théoret 2010, Uhde and Michalak 2010, Nijskens 
and Wagner 2011, Sanya and Wolfe 2011), our results suggest that OBS activities 
might also help banks hedge and better allocate their risks in the long-run (Stiroh 
2004).  
To the extent that the cyclical aspects of banks collective behaviour are related to 
the efficiency and stability of the financial system, an important contribution of our 
study is first to show that, despite the change in the banking landscape, banks herd-like 
behaviour remains predominantly a cyclical phenomenon at long horizons, particularly 
at play during economic contractions; and second that, nevertheless, shadow banking 
might have changed the way banks manage risks. On the one hand, in the traditional 
Baumol sense, market-oriented banking offers a more efficient management of liquid-
ity. With the development of shadow banking, liquidity management is more in sink 
with leverage fluctuations, conventional liquidity ratios are strikingly lower, the ratio 
of loans loss provisions seems also lower, while, concomitantly, banks effective lever-
age can increase. On the other hand however, this new banking landscape is also ac-
companied by increased strategic complementarities, higher risk and higher probabili-
ties of insolvency. In this respect, our study suggests that, far from having reduced 
banking cyclicality, despite the greater risk-sharing embodied in non-traditional activi-
ties, the new business lines could actually increase the volatility of banks assets.  ©   C CH HR RI IS ST TI IA AN N   C CA AL LM MÈ ÈS S   A AN ND D   R RA AY YM MO ON ND D   T TH HÉ ÉO OR RE ET T, ,   M MA AR RK KE ET T- -O OR RI IE EN NT TE ED D   B BA AN NK KI IN NG G   A AN ND D   B BA AN NK K   S SY YS ST TE EM MI IC C   R RI IS SK K, ,   
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The main macroprudential policy implication we can derive from this study is that 
the cyclicality of OBS activities should be closely monitored by the regulatory agen-
cies in charge of financial stability. The traditional role of banks, which consists in 
providing liquidities sur demande to the economic system is obviously challenged by 
the development of banks non-traditional activities, which melt conventional and in-
vestment banking. In particular, our study shows that, in this dimension, the banking 
system is both volatile and exposed to the business cycle. Macroprudential policy-
makers face a delicate conundrum, as the increase in banking aggregate risk (relative 
to idiosyncratic risk), one of the most singular characteristics of the new banking envi-
ronment
28, is accompanied by a new concept of liquidity, not yet fully understood (Lu-
cas and Stokey 2011, Loutskina 2011). For example, when it comes to the Basle III 
proposed mandatory leverage ratio, we would strongly advocate to envisage broader 
definitions of leverage to fully capture the new liquidity management practices associ-





The banks portfolio model 
 
As usually assumed in the literature, the returns on the two categories of assets 
which compose the representative bank portfolio are given by the following equations:  
S
i,t f i, t, r r            (5) 
ra
i,t f i,t i, t, r r                 (6) 
where 
S
i,t r  is the return on the security for bank i at time t;  f r  is the return on a risk-free 
                                                      
28 Houston and Stiroh (2006) and Gennaioli et al. (2011) find that bank systemic risk increased with the development of shadow banking, 
while idiosyncratic risk decreased thanks to the greater diversification enabled by OBS activities.  
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i,t r  is the return on the risky asset. The expected return on the risky asset is 
equal to  f r   , where   is the expected risk premium assumed to be fixed. The idio-
syncratic risk is represented by the random variable  ) , 0 ( ~
2
, , t t i N    . At time t, when 
bank i determines the optimal allocation of its portfolio between the security and the 
risky asset, it is confronted to uncertainty,  i,t   (Equation (6)). Assume that at time t 
each bank i observes an imperfect signal  i,t S  which enables the bank to formulate a 
prediction on the value of  i,t  : ,, it it t S     , with  ) , 0 ( ~
2
,t t N     and   0 it t E, 
29. 
The assumption of orthogonality between  it   and  t   may be justified by considering  t   
as an aggregate shock uncorrelated to the idiosyncratic shock. At time t, each bank i 
observes a different signal  i,t S  comprising an heterogeneous shock  i,t   and a homoge-
nous noise  t   whose intensity 
2
,t   is time varying. We assume that 
2
,t   is driven by 
macroeconomic uncertainty so that when uncertainty rises, the noise incorporated in 
the signal rises with 
2
,t   , and it becomes increasingly difficult to determine the true 
value of  i,t   and the optimal return on loans. The best way to predict the return on the 
risky asset is then to estimate  i,t i,t E| S      , the expected value of the idiosyncratic noise 
conditional on the signal. Even if    i,t E  , the unconditional expectation of the idiosyn-
cratic noise, is equal to 0, this is not the case for its conditional counterpart. Consistent 
with Baum et al. (2002, 2004) we thus assume that the conditional expectation of  i,t   is 
equal to a proportion  t   of the signal: 
i,t i,t t i,t t i, t, E |S                      (7)    
with 
                                                      
29 For a canonical form of this banking theory based on signal extraction see Rajan (1994). Rajan relates the signal to the publication of banks 
earnings rather than macroeconomic time series, but there is obviously a close link between bank earnings and macroeconomic aggregates 
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  (8) 
  We then compute  it w , the optimal share of the risky asset in the bank portfolio. 
The expected return of the portfolio conditional on the signal is equal to: 
    1 i,t i,t i,t f t i,t i,t f i, t, E R |S w r S w r         

     (9) 
and the conditional variance of the portfolio is: 
22
i,t i,t t ,t i,t i, t, Var R |S w      

         (10) 
According to this straightforward model, the portfolio variance is simply an increasing 
function of macroeconomic uncertainty
2
,t   . Banks maximize a standard utility func-
tion  i,t V   which depends positively on the expected return of the portfolio, and nega-
tively on risk as measured by its variance, 
1
2 i, t
i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t
w
i, t, argmaxE V |S E R |S Var R |S              
 
  (11)
    
where   is the bank degree of risk aversion. Equating the derivative of Equation (11) 
with respect to wi,t to 0, we obtain the optimal value of the share of the risky asset in 












            
  (12) 
Combining Equations (12) and (8) we can finally compute the variance of the cross-
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Its derivative with respect to macroeconomic uncertainty 
2















     
          (14)
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The conditional variance constructs 
 
In line with Baum et al. (2002, 2004, 2009) and Quagliariello (2007, 2009) we 
model our conditional variances, i.e. the indicators of macroeconomic uncertainty, us-
ing GARCH (p,q) specifications (Bollerslev 1986). However, contrary to these au-
thors, we also introduce EGARCH specifications (Nelson 1991) to model macroeco-
nomic uncertainty and test the herd-like hypothesis. Assume a simple general econo-
metric model written as: 
tt t YX                  (15) 
with  t Y  the vector of the dependent variable,  t X  the matrix of the explanatory vari-
ables,   
2 0 tt ~ iid ,   the innovation, and 
2
t   the conditional variance of the innova-
tion. This conditional variance follows a GARCH (1,1) process if it can be written as 
follows:  
22 2
11 tt t                        (16) 
which can be generalized to a GARCH (p,q) process by adding p lags to  t   and q lags 
to 
2
t  . Equations (15) and (16) are estimated simultaneously using the maximum like-
lihood estimator.  
Then, to build the conditional variances of our two proxies of macroeconomic un-
certainty, respectively based on the GDP and the consumer price index, we first trans-
form these variables in growth rates so that we can work with stationary time series. 
Otherwise, if the series were not transformed in quarterly percentage rate of changes, 
the resulting conditional variances would be dominated by the trend of these variables. 
Transforming the series this way enables us to capture the cyclical fluctuations of the ©   C CH HR RI IS ST TI IA AN N   C CA AL LM MÈ ÈS S   A AN ND D   R RA AY YM MO ON ND D   T TH HÉ ÉO OR RE ET T, ,   M MA AR RK KE ET T- -O OR RI IE EN NT TE ED D   B BA AN NK KI IN NG G   A AN ND D   B BA AN NK K   S SY YS ST TE EM MI IC C   R RI IS SK K, ,   
0 06 6/ /1 12 2/ /2 20 01 11 1   1 10 0: :2 21 1: :0 00 0   A AM M. .      
  37
proxies. 
Insert Table A2 here 
The computations related to the conditional variables are provided in Table A2. To 
construct the conditional variance of GDP growth, the measure of macroeconomic un-
certainty related to this variable, we first rely on an ARMA (2,2) specification to esti-
mate the GDP growth expected mean, selected on the basis of the usual Akaike and 
Schwartz criteria. We then use an EGARCH (1,1) to compute the associated condi-
tional variance of GDP growth after experimenting with several GARCH processes
30. 
The estimations results are provided in Table A2. The estimated coefficient of asym-
metry  1   (Equation (4)) is negative, so bad news indeed seem to have a leverage effect 
on the volatility of GDP growth. Since the resulting profile of the conditional volatility 
of GDP growth is somewhat unstable, we also use a weighted variance of the current 
and last three quarters’ conditional variances (cv_gdp_w), with arithmetic weights 0.4, 
0.3, 0.2 and 0.1.  Similarly, the conditional variance of inflation is computed with an 
IGARCH(1,1)
31 (integrated GARCH) resulting from an AR(1) estimation. The condi-
tional variance seems very persistent, the coefficient of 
2
1 t    being estimated at 0.78. 
                                                      
30 For the tests related to the selection of a GARCH process, see Franses and van Dijk (2000).  
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OLS estimations of the cross-sectional dispersions of lta and snonin  
 
  Table A3 provides the OLS estimations of the cross-sectional dispersions of lta 
and snonin over the period 1997-2010, the model specifications being the same as 
those used for the EGARCH estimations (Table 1). As mentioned, the results are poor 
compared to those obtained with our EGARCH procedure. In particular, the results as-
sociated with the OLS estimation of disp(lta) are clearly unsatisfactory. Indeed, the on-
ly variable which is significant at the 5% level across all the model specifications is the 
rate of growth of GDP, which displays the same sign as in the EGARCH estimation. 
The conditional variance of GDP (cv_gdp) has the expected negative sign but is not 
significant, while the conditional variance of inflation (cv_inf) has the wrong sign, also 
insignificant.  Moreover, the output gap has a sign opposite to its EGARCH estimate, 
although insignificant. The dtl variable has the same sign as in the EGARCH estima-
tion but is also not significant.  
Insert Table A3 here 
  The results obtained with the OLS estimation of disp(snonin) are more in line with 
those resulting from our EGARCH estimation. The variable cv_gdp has the expected 
sign and is significant at the 10% level, while cv_inf has also the right sign and is sig-
nificant at the 5% level. Similarly, for disp(snonin), the variable dtl has the same sign 
as in the EGARCH estimation in the model featuring cv_gdp as the indicator of mac-
roeconomic uncertainty, and is significant at the 10% level. Overall, the OLS estima-
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since they remain the same with a linear approach. In this case, the OLS results consti-
tute an additional evidence that banks market-oriented business lines are quite sensitive 
to the business cycle. This observation suggests that herding seems indeed to be more 
severe for market-oriented activities than for loans, a finding which underlines the fra-
gility to which new business lines expose the banking system.   
  Finally, note that the OLS estimations do not deliver significant results regarding 
the impact of the marcoeconomic first moments. In this respect, the results we obtain 
when modelling the innovation volatility are superior for both disp(lta) and 
disp(snonin). In this respect, it appears quite important to model the conditional vola-
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Table 1 EGARCH(1,1) estimations without instruments 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
constant 38.43 41.09 28.41 5.11 4.48 -2.67







dln(gdp) 0.83 0.86 1.65
0.079 0.059 0.000
output_gap 91.73 50.05 60.40 287.26 295.33 306.92
0.000 0.099 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000
inf -1.27 -0.46
0.050 0.890
dtl -5.10 -5.37 -2.01 18.86 19.39 23.82
0.000 0.000 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.000
y t-1 0.59 0.60 0.43 0.18 0.18 -
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
EGARCH
θ 1 (assym.) 1.00 0.85 0.99 0.99 1.05 0.73
0.006 0.085 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.014
θ 2 -0.52 -0.55 -0.81 -2.16 -2.23 -1.76
0.180 0.188 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.000
θ 3 0.60 0.62 0.67 0.13 0.13 0.14
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.181 0.416 0.000
R-squared 0.35 0.35 0.28 0.64 0.64 0.61
Adj. R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.19 0.60 0.60 0.57




Notes: For each dependent variable, colums (1) and (3) are the models with, respec-
tively, the conditional variances of GDP and inflation as the factors of macroeconomic 
uncertainty. Column (2) reproduces column (1) specification except that the factor of 
macroeconomic uncertainty is the weighted conditional variance of GDP instead of its 
punctual value. The variables notation reads as follows: disp(lta): cross-sectional dis-
persion of loans-to-assets ratio; disp(snonin): cross-sectional dispersion of snonin; 
cv_gdp: conditional variance of gdp growth; cv_gdp_w: weighted conditional variance 
of gdp growth; cv_inf: conditional variance of inflation; dln(gdp): gdp growth rate 
computed as the first difference of the logarithm of GDP; output_gap: deviation of 
log(gdp) from its Hodrick-Prescott trend; inf: inflation rate; dtl: degree of total lever-
age. Outliers are controlled with dummies not reported in the table for the sake of clar-
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Table 2 Short-run and long-run elasticities of the cross-sectional dispersions with respect to lever-
age and macroeconomic indicators 
 
cv_gdp cv_gdp_w cv_inf dtl dln(gdp) inf
disp(lta)
short-term -0.03 -0.12 -0.07 -0.45 0.04 -0.02
long-term -0.08 -0.29 -0.14 -1.12 0.11 -0.04
disp(snonin)
short-term -0.02 -0.04 -0.14 0.72 - -0.01
long-term -0.03 -0.05 -0.14 0.87 - -0.01  
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     Table 3  IV-EGARCH(1,1) estimations 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
constant 34.41 35.65 29.32 4.73 2.92 -2.40







dln(gdp) 0.85 0.79 1.75
0.000 0.053 0.000
output_gap 85.95 76.71 82.34 318.90 288.17 214.84
0.000 0.024 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000
inf -1.93 7.39
0.038 0.000
-3.83 -3.61 -2.36 19.33 20.15 21.44
0.000 0.070 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000
y t-1 0.60 0.59 0.51 0.20 0.20 -
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
EGARCH
θ 1  (assym.) 1.08 0.82 1.23 1.13 0.79 0.54
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.000
θ 2 -0.70 -0.55 -1.18 -2.77 -1.60 -1.85
0.013 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000
θ 3 0.56 0.53 0.52 -0.26 0.14 0.35
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.283 0.654 0.000
R-squared 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.64 0.64 0.62
Adj. R-squared 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.60 0.60 0.57









Notes: For each dependent variable, colums (1) and (3) are the models with, respec-
tively, the conditional variances of GDP and inflation as the factors of macroeco-
nomic uncertainty. Column (2) reproduces column (1) specification except that the 
factor of macroeconomic uncertainty is the weighted conditional variance of GDP 
instead of its punctual value. The variables notation reads as follows:  disp(lta): 
cross-sectional dispersion of loans-to-assets ratio; disp(snonin): cross-sectional dis-
persion of snonin; cv_gdp_w: weighted conditional variance of gdp growth; cv_inf: 
conditional variance of inflation; dln(gdp): gdp growth rate computed as the first 
difference of the logarithm of GDP ; output_gap: deviation of log(gdp) from its 
Hodrick-Prescott trend; inf: inflation rate; dtl: degree of total leverage. Hatted vari-
ables are computed using predetermined values of the explanatory variables and 
their higher moments as instruments. Outliers are controlled with dummies not re-
ported in the table for the sake of clarity. Coefficient p-values are reported in italics. 
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Table A2 Conditional variances of GDP growth and inflation 
 
 
                                       GDP growth                                                    inflation                                               
                 
Variable Coefficient p-value Variable Coefficient p-value
C 1.31 0.000 C 1.87 0.000
AR(1) 0.75 0.001 AR(1) 0.74 0.000
AR(2) -0.49 0.000




EGARCH equation GARCH-1 0.78 0.000
θ 1  (assymmetry coef.) -0.19 0.273
θ 2 0.59 0.000 R-squared 0.43




Durbin-Watson 1.57  
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Table A3 Standard OLS estimations 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
constant 33.59 33.86 31.76 14.80 14.00 3.57







dln(gdp) 2.45 2.42 2.32
0.001 0.001 0.001
output_gap -3.69 -9.27 3.54 292.51 288.01 230.23
0.955 0.886 0.955 0.062 0.102 0.093
inf -1.39 -0.46
0.445 0.890
dtl -3.98 -3.78 -3.89 17.62 17.98 -1.41
0.223 0.257 0.244 0.002 0.002 0.844
y t-1 0.67 0.67 0.61 0.14 0.13 -
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.149 0.190 -
R-squared 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.66 0.65 0.66
Adj. R-squared 0.34 0.33 0.29 0.62 0.62 0.62




Notes: For each dependent variable, Colums (1) and (3) are the models with, respec-
tively, the conditional variances of GDP and inflation as the factors for macroeco-
nomic uncertainty. Column (2) reproduces column (1) specification except that the 
factor of macroeconomic uncertainty is the weighted conditional variance of GDP in-
stead of its ponctual value. The variables notation reads as follows: disp(lta): cross-
sectional dispersion of loans-to-assets ratio; disp(snonin): cross-sectional dispersion of 
snonin; cv_gdp: conditional variance of gdp growth; cv_gdp_w: weighted conditional 
variance of gdp growth; cv_inf: conditional variance of inflation; dln(gdp): gdp growth 
rate computed as the first difference of the logarithm of GDP; output_gap: deviation of 
log(gdp) from its Hodrick-Prescott trend; inf: inflation rate; dtl: degree of total lever-
age. Outliers are controlled with dummies not reported in the table for the sake of clar-
ity. Coefficient p-values are reported in italics. The p -values are adjusted for het-












 ©   C CH HR RI IS ST TI IA AN N   C CA AL LM MÈ ÈS S   A AN ND D   R RA AY YM MO ON ND D   T TH HÉ ÉO OR RE ET T, ,   M MA AR RK KE ET T- -O OR RI IE EN NT TE ED D   B BA AN NK KI IN NG G   A AN ND D   B BA AN NK K   S SY YS ST TE EM MI IC C   R RI IS SK K, ,   






















Source: Canadian Bankers Association.  
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Figure 3 Cross-sectional dispersion of lta and snonin v/s the output gap 
 




































Note: Shaded areas correspond to periods of contractions or marked economic slowdown. The trends of the cross-sectional disper-





Figure 4 Moving average variance of the level and logarithms of banks loans 
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Eight quarters moving average of the variance of the loans logarithm
 
 
Note: Shaded areas correspond to periods of contractions or marked economic slowdown. 
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Figure 5 Moving average variance of the level and logarithms of banks noninterest income 
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Eight quarters moving average of the variance
of the logarithm of noninterest income
 
 
Note: Shaded areas correspond to periods of contractions or marked economic slowdown.   





Figure 6 Scatter diagrams of the cross-sectional dispersions of lta and snonin with their respective 
cross-sectional covariance  
 














































.00 .04 .08 .12 .16 .20 .24
disp(snonin)
c
o
v
(
s
n
o
n
i
n
)
correlation: -0.91
2008-Q3
2008-Q4
2008-Q2
2008-Q1
2002-Q3
  